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Abstract 
The standard view in current philosophy of creativity says that being creative has two requirements: 
being novel and being valuable (to which a third intentionality requirement is often added; Sternberg 
and Lubart 1999; Boden 2004; Gaut 2010). However, the standard view on creativity has recently 
become an object of critical scrutiny. Bird and Hills (2018) have specifically proposed to remove the 
value requirement from the definition, as it is not clear that creative objects are necessarily valuable 
and creative people necessarily praiseworthy. In this paper, I argue against Bird and Hills (2018), since 
eliminating the element of value from the explanation of creativity hinders the understanding of the 
role that actual creative objects and ideas play in epistemic practices, which are fundamentally 
normative. More specifically, I argue that the terms ‘creativity’ and ‘creative’ function as thick epistemic 
concepts when employed by competent epistemic agents in practice, that is, these concepts have both a 
descriptive and an evaluative content that cannot be disentangled from one another. Accordingly, I 
suggest that philosophers should prefer thick accounts over thin accounts of creativity. A thick account 
of creativity is one that endorses the standard view at its basis, but further develops it in two ways: 
by stressing the entanglement of the value and novelty requirements; by permitting to encompass a 
range of domain-specific characterizations of such entanglement for different epistemic situations. In 
order to take the first step in the development of such a thick account, I look at the domain of scientific 
practice as a case in point, and try to spell out what the thickness (or entanglement of novelty and 
worth) of creative instances typically entails here. Namely, I identify the worthy novelty of creative 
models and methods with their potential to clarify a tradition, with fruitfulness, and with the fulfilment 
of exploratory aims. 
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0. Introduction 
 
One of the most widely adopted definitions of creativity in contemporary philosophical 
debates says that creativity is the ability to produce novel and valuable objects (Boden 2004: 
1; Sternberg and Lubart 1999), to which an element of intentionality or agency is often added 
(Kieran 2004; Stokes 2008; Gaut 2012). Also known as the standard view on creativity, this 
definition appears to capture what is crucial about creativity when we employ the concept in 
everyday talk. From moments when we praise a child for producing a whimsical drawing, to 
encounters with artworks that astound us, and to occasions when we celebrate a new scientific 
invention, we refer to certain objects and ideas that are both novel and valuable as creative. 
Moreover, the way in which creativity is treated by governing, regulatory, and educational 
organizations reinforces the idea that creative products are highly valuable. The United 
Nations “regards creativity as a major component not only of spiritual life, but also of the 
material and economic life of persons and populations”2. The European Commission has 
developed the programme Creative Europe to provide “conditions for innovation and 
creativity […] that can be turned into products and services that create growth and jobs and 
help address societal changes”.3 The BIAC of the OECD sustains that creativity is “essential 
for sustainable growth and economic development”4. A similar praise for creativity seems to 
be ingrained in our accounts of the past. General histories of science and art describe how the 
greatest individuals of each domain exemplify extraordinary creativity. Einstein, Picasso, da 
Vinci and Mozart are considered to possess the “gift of creative genius” (Miller 1998), in 
virtue of which they produced exceptionally novel and valuable works that brought greatness 
to the societies in which they lived. We could say that the idea of the genius has for very long 
served as the paradigm of what being creative is about.  
Looking at these common assumptions, it is not surprising that we quickly associate 
creativity with something highly treasured. However, the unconditional appraisal of 
creativity has recently become an object of critical scrutiny. When so many accomplishments 
and merits are associated to creativity, we might need to reconsider what we are exactly 
praising when we praise it, and recalibrate the scope of the achievements that creativity can 
actually comprise. Some philosophers of art and science have for instance rejected the idea of 
the creative genius altogether, as it only consolidates a romantic myth around certain 
individuals who are supposed to possess an innate gift and experience moments of inspiration 
that cannot be rationally explained. This myth, they argue, hampers the project of 
naturalizing creativity or studying it also as part of ordinary cognitive processes in everyday 
practices (see Kronfeldner 2014; Gaut 2012; Carroll 2010; and Weisberg 1986 for arguments 
 
2 Resolution 71/284, World Creativity and Innovation Day, UN General Assembly 
<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/normative-action/creativity/>. In 2017 the UNESCO 
resolved to establish a Creativity Day to “raise awareness of the role of creativity and innovation in problem-
solving and, by extension, economic, social and sustainable development”. 
3 Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020): <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R1295&from=EN> 
4 BIAC (Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD) “Creativity, Innovation and Economic 
Growth in the 21st century” (2003). 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1185/c61825f338c9485de8511b40944a70344805.pdf> 
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against the myth of the creative genius).5 Another criticism to the standard view on creativity 
has been recently formulated by Alexander Bird and Alison Hills (2018) with regards to the 
value requirement in it. These philosophers argue that we should refrain from assuming that 
being valuable is necessary for being creative. In their article “Against Creativity”, Bird and 
Hills reject “the unreflective approval of creativity”, which is “both widespread and deeply 
misguided”, and propose a new definition of creativity in which the element of value is absent 
except for very exceptional circumstances (2018: 18).  
In this paper, I examine the specific arguments that Bird and Hills (2018) offer to reject 
the standard view, and conclude that they are not persuasive enough to convince us to remove 
the value requirement from our explanations of creativity. With a focus on epistemic contexts, 
I show that we should keep the element of value in any fruitful explanation of creativity 
because, as a matter of fact, the terms ‘creativity’ and ‘creative’ function as thick epistemic 
concepts in practice (Williams 1985; Dancy 1995; Putnam 2002; Kirchin 2013). That is to say, 
these concepts, when employed by competent epistemic agents to qualify certain objects 
(ideas, acts, etc.), express both an evaluative attitude towards such objects (identifiable with 
an element of epistemic worth) and a descriptive content (identifiable with an element of 
novelty), which cannot be disentangled from one another. In other words, creativity 
attributions assign a ‘novel worth’ or ‘worthy novelty’ to the objects they qualify.  
Accordingly, I suggest that philosophers should prefer thick accounts over thin accounts 
of creativity. Drawing on recent proposals to advance thicker forms of epistemology (Axtell 
and Carter 2008; Elgin 2008; Roberts 2018; Poznic 2018), I define a thick account of creativity 
as one that endorses the standard view at its basis, but further develops it in two ways: by 
stressing the entanglement of the value and novelty requirements; by permitting to 
encompass a range of domain-specific, narrowed-down, and flexible characterizations of such 
entanglement for different epistemic situations. 
Crucially, the arguments I present here are compatible with a critical attitude towards 
the myth of the creative genius, the unreflective approval of creative ideas and objects, and 
the misattribution of unwarranted merits to creative people. In other words, this paper does 
not aim to extol the value of creativity in general but to spell out the (restricted) sense in 
which creative instances are epistemically worthy in concrete situations. For instance, I 
believe that we should refrain from identifying the value of creativity in general with the 
value of thin concepts, which are predominant in traditional epistemology, such as ‘justification’, 
‘knowledge’ or ‘true belief’ (Axtell and Carter 2008; Kotzee and Wanderer 2008; Roberts 
2018). Creativity, like other thick epistemic concepts, exhibits a sui generis form of value, 
attached to a novelty aspect, that needs to be characterized in its own terms. Taking scientific 
practices as a case in point, I try to spell out what this sui generis value of creativity usually 
comprises in this domain. In science, I observe, the novel worth of creative models and 
methods can be typically identified with the clarification of a tradition, fruitfulness, and the 
fulfilment of exploratory aims.  
 
5 Also numerous historians of science and art have rejected the ideal of the creative genius for different but 
complementary reasons, that is, this ideal overemphasizes individual achievement against the context of the time 
and work of others (see Fara 2002; Schaffer 1994). I thank the editors of this topical collection for their input on 
this, among many other, points throughout the paper. 
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I start section 1 disputing Bird and Hills’s (2018) arguments in favour of a value-free 
definition of creativity, while acknowledging some important criticisms to the standard view 
they make. Then, in section 2, I propose to understand creativity as a thick epistemic concept, 
based on how epistemic agents actually make creativity attributions in practice. Lastly, in 
section 3, I focus on scientific practices, and suggest various ways of spelling out what the 
epistemic worth of creative models and methods usually comprises here. These final 
suggestions should be taken as a first step towards the advancement of a more comprehensive 
thick account of creativity in the future, which would also include an analysis of the value of 
creative instances in other epistemic situations, as well as aesthetic and everyday contexts. 
 
 
1. Creativity without value: Response to Bird and Hills (2018) 
 
The standard view on creativity can be traced back to Kant in the Critique of Judgment,  
where he defines the creative genius as someone who produces works that are “original” and 
at the same time “exemplary” (1790/2001: 43–50). In recent philosophy of creativity, the 
standard view has been endorsed among others by Sternberg and Lubart (1999: 3), who argue 
that creativity is “the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) 
and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints)”, and Boden (2004: 1), who 
argues that it is “an ability to come up with ideas or artefacts that are new, surprising and 
valuable”. Other philosophers in the debate usually accept the standard view as an adequate, 
although minimal, explanation of creativity, and propose to expand it adding other conditions. 
Kieran (2014), Gaut (2012), and Stokes (2008) for instance argue that the definition of 
creativity requires to include some form of intentionality in order to avoid cases of accidental 
creativity. For Kieran (2014) what is required is “motivation”, for Gaut (2012) “flair”, and for 
Stokes (2008) “agency”. There are, in addition, ongoing debates about whether the definition 
of creativity should be principally focused on creative individuals –in which case creativity is 
understood as a disposition or ability– or on creative objects, creative processes, or even 
creative groups (Currie 2018; Stokes and Paul 2016; Klausen 2010; Paulus and Coskun 2011).  
At the risk of losing scope of these various interrelated debates in the current 
philosophy of creativity, I would like to discuss one particular attempt to invalidate the 
standard view by philosophers Alexander Bird and Alison Hill (2018). In their article “Against 
Creativity”, they propose a substantial redefinition of the concept of creativity with respect to 
the standard view, which consists in eliminating the value requirement, keeping the novelty 
requirement, and adding three further requirements, imagination, fertility, and motivation 
(Ibid.: 7). Although this section mainly focuses on contesting the first of these moves, I will 
introduce some brief considerations to how Bird and Hills’ proposed role for the imagination 
can enrich an account of creativity as a disposition of individuals. 
Bird and Hills ask themselves the questions: are creative works always valuable?, are 
creative people unquestionably praiseworthy?, and respond negatively to them. For that 
reason, they claim, it is necessary to reject the unreflective approval of creativity, and only 
acknowledge the connection between being creative and being valuable in very unusual 
circumstances in which the right conditions are met (2018: 2, 18). Three specific reasons are 
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offered to support this position: 1) it is possible for creative people to manifest their creativity 
–one and the same disposition– in producing good ideas and bad ideas; 2) it is possible to 
know that an object has been produced creatively without knowing its value; and 3) creativity 
can produce objects of wholly negative value (2018: 8). In the following, I argue that none of 
these reasons is sufficiently convincing.  
 
1.1. Creative people can produce good and bad ideas 
The first argument that Bird and Hills offer to eliminate the value condition from the 
definition of creativity is introduced with the help of the following example: 
William Herschel discovered the planet Uranus and also infrared radiation; yet he also 
had entirely false ideas about other planets (that the Moon was rather like the English 
countryside, that the surface of the Sun was cool and inhabited). It is simply not 
plausible that one set of dispositions (creativity) produced the good ideas of […] 
Herschel and quite another generated the bad ones. Distinguishing between their good 
and bad ideas in term of creativity is neither psychologically realistic nor explanatorily 
appropriate nor descriptively useful. (Bird and Hills 2018:12) 
If being valuable is necessary for being creative, so the argument goes, one would have 
to postulate that Herschel’s creativity was responsible for the discovery of Uranus and 
infrared radiation, while another disposition was responsible for the false, worthless claims 
that Herschel made. This is highly counterintuitive though. We would usually assume that it 
was the same set of dispositions that allowed Herschel to produce objects of value sometimes, 
and valueless objects other times. Thus, Bird and Hills argue, we should explain creativity in 
terms of novelty and the use of the imagination (also motivation and fertility), without 
introducing a value requirement, so that we can account for the possibility of being creative 
and nevertheless producing bad ideas. 
This argument focuses on creativity as a disposition of individuals. It rightly assumes 
that not all the ideas produced by an individual, even a historically exemplary scientist like 
Herschel, were true or good. Indeed, most people would easily accept that scientists and 
artists have unfortunate ideas sometimes, and this includes philosophers who endorse the 
standard view on creativity as well. This fact, however, does not present any serious challenge 
for their endorsement of the standard view, contrary to what Bird and Hills seem to imply.  
I believe that it is possible to contest argument 1) after examining what Bird and Hills 
mean with producing “good” and “bad” ideas in the quote above. There, they appear to identify 
a good idea with a true idea and a bad idea with a false idea (2018: 12). Thus, they separate 
Herschel’s ideas into two groups, one for ideas that are true and therefore valuable, and one 
for ideas that are false and therefore worthless.6 This is, however, a way of understanding the 
value condition in the definition of creativity that we don’t have to endorse. 
Indeed, in everyday talk as well as in specialized epistemic and aesthetic practices, we 
rarely attribute value to a creative idea in the sense of considering it, qua creative, “valuable 
 
6 In sections 1.2. I refer back to Bird and Hills’s (2018) views on true and false ideas and discuss them more 
precisely.  
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as true”, “valuable as good in general” or “value as good tout court”. If we think that a good 
idea can only be valuable in any of these three senses, then I agree with Bird and Hills that 
“distinguishing between good and bad ideas in term of creativity is […not] explanatorily 
appropriate” (2018: 12). What I am suggesting is that an account of creativity does not have 
to define the value of creativity in any of these ways, because, as a matter of fact, our 
attributions of value to creative objects and people are much more limited and specific in 
practice. An account of creativity should, instead, characterize creative products as “valuable-
in-a-way” in relation to their novelty, and always dependent on the aims and standards of 
acceptability of a certain community. As Gaut (2018: 141) has also argued, creative products 
are never “valuable simpliciter” or “valuable period”, but valuable in a conditional manner that 
depends on the kinds and contexts to which those products belong. 
Thus, a standard view advocate could accept that some ideas are both bad and creative, 
if with bad one understands that they are neither valuable in general nor substantially true. 
Yet, a standard view advocate would at the same time sustain that those ideas are valuable-
in-a-way that relates to the role of their novelty. To put it in other words, one could 
unproblematically claim that Herschel’s ideas about Uranus as much as his ideas about the 
surface of the Moon were creative, and qua creative they were valuable-in-a-way. But this 
does not imply that one ought to consider all of Herschel’s ideas equally valuable. We may 
think that his ideas about Uranus were more valuable than his ideas about the surface of the 
Moon, but just because they were, apart from creative, also more predictively accurate, 
externally consistent, and observationally rigorous. In section 3, I offer a more specific 
characterization of what “valuable-in-a-way” usually comprises for the case of creative models 
and methods in scientific practice.  
 
1.2. We can recognize creative objects without knowing their value  
The second argument that Bird and Hills (2018) offer to defend a value-free definition 
of creativity asks the question: “Do we need to know the value of what has been produced in 
order to know whether it has been produced creatively?”. To it, they respond negatively as 
well (Ibid.: 11). The example that Bird and Hills introduce this time are Leonardo da Vinci’s 
famous sketches of flying machines. They claim that “we do not need to know whether 
Leonardo’s designs stood any chance of working nor whether if they did they would have 
been of use to anyone in order to judge that these ideas manifested his creativity” (Ibid.: 12). 
Although I agree with this claim, it is for different reasons than the ones that Bird and Hills 
have. While I do not think that there has to be a final working object actually constructed to 
be able to judge whether da Vinci’s sketches were valuable or not, Bird and Hills 
fundamentally associate the value of da Vinci’s sketches with their final realizability or truth. 
For that reason, they claim to be judging da Vinci’s sketches creative “without knowing their 
value” (Ibid.). On the contrary, I sustain that when we judge da Vinci’s sketches creative we 
are already ascribing them –and probably the process that gave rise to them– a (limited) value 
connected to their novelty, whether or not such value translates into a workable device or a 
set of substantially true statement afterwards.  
More specifically, da Vinci’s sketches are valuable (qua creative) because they informed 
and expanded a previous tradition of studies on flight and air resistance. As Galluzi (2020: 
[Preprint]    Sánchez-Dorado (2020) 
 7 
103-106) argued, his designs advanced “bold analogies” between the flight of birds and man-
powered mechanisms, and served as instruments for visualizing theoretical hypotheses 
regarding the problem of human aviation. Even if most of da Vinci’s theoretical hypotheses 
on flight were never successfully realized, the sketches advanced understanding of the 
differences between the power-to-weight ratio in birds and humans (Kemp 2006: 104-106, 
249-250). For instance, they helped to see that the quest for aviation could not be based on 
the imitation of the full dynamism of natural flight, given that the power-to-weight ratio in 
humans proved this unfeasible, but it could be based, at least partially, on the mechanical 
imitation of birds’ gliding motions in air currents (Ibid.). In fact, Kemp (2006: 249-250) 
observes that some of da Vinci’s wing designs proved to function well in hang-glidering. 
Arguably, the hang-glidering case is an exception and for most of da Vinci’s sketches 
there is no evidence of objects constructed after them that demonstrate the truth of his 
theoretical hypotheses. Still, the sketches should be considered epistemically valuable qua 
creative because they condense a variety of technical, mathematical, and pictorial resources 
in novel and stimulating ways that expanded a tradition in the study of human flight and air 
resistance. Importantly, the fact that the value of creativity in cases like this is not translatable 
into realizability does not mean accepting “original nonsenses” as possible cases of creativity 
(see Kant [1790/2001: 43–50], and based on it Gaut [2010: 1039] and Paul and Kaufman 
[2014] for discussions regarding the idea of “original nonsense”). This is because nonsense 
is not valuable in any epistemically relevant way, while creative products are valuable-in-a-
way. And da Vinci’s sketches are far from being nonsense: they are intelligible and build on 
previous projects to develop mechanical flight. 
At some point Bird and Hills (2018) certainly remark that their conception of value is 
not exclusively identifiable with truth: “of course we acknowledge that a scientific theory may 
not be true (even approximately) but may nevertheless have some kind of value, contributing 
in some degree to the progress of science” (Ibid.: 9). They mention “knowledge, 
understanding, or anything else of scientific value” as possible alternatives to truth in defining 
the value of creativity (Ibid.: 14). This might appear to locate Bird and Hills’ position closer 
to the idea of “valuable-in-a-way” that I am endorsing here. However, their acknowledgment 
of epistemic value beyond truth is still very constrained and cannot accommodate the type of 
characterizations of epistemic worth that I am contemplating here (see sections 2 and 3). This 
is because, one, Bird and Hills appear to hold a strongly factive conception of what 
“knowledge, understanding, or anything else of scientific value” are, which is patent in their 
assessment of the epistemic achievements of Herschel or Ancient Greek science, among other 
examples they use, exclusively in terms of the true claims they produced (Ibid.). Two, the 
most explicit way in which Bird and Hills recognize epistemic value beyond truth is by 
claiming that “discovering why the theory is false may increase our grasp of the subject 
matter” (Ibid. 9). This is, however, a very narrow way of conceding epistemic merit to 
scientific theories that are not literally true. It doesn’t say anything about the qualities of such 
theories or how we might learn from them, but only that recognizing their falsity may help 
us advance in our inquiry by eliminating them. In contrast, I propose to endorse a more 
flexible conception of epistemic value, as spelt out below, that is able to recognize the worth 
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of creative instances also when they involve rough approximations, metaphors, or strong 
idealizations that are not substantially true (Elgin 2008, 2017; Potochnik 2015, 2017).7  
 
1.3. Creativity can produce objects of wholly negative value  
Lastly, argument 3) is, I believe, the strongest reason Bird and Hills (2018) offer to 
support a value-free definition of creativity. They argue that creative people can produce 
objects of wholly negative value, as it is shown in cases of ‘malevolent’ or ‘dark creativity’ 
(Gaut 2010: 1039; also see Cropley et al. 2008; Cropley 2011; Novitz 2003; McLaren 1993). 
These cases are situations that we recognize as creative, but that concern matters such as 
committing a crime, murdering, producing torture instruments, or carrying out reprovable 
actions of various kinds. Cropley (2011) and James and Taylor (2010) have for instance 
discussed the attacks of 9/11 as a notorious recent case of dark creativity. The example that 
Bird and Hills introduce is the following: 
The zealot of the French Revolution, Jean-Baptiste Carrier, executed his victims in 
increasingly novel and imaginative ways, including the infamous “Republican 
Marriage” whereby a male prisoner and a female prisoner would be bound together, 
naked, and then thrown into the Loire. Creativity can be put to work in doing bad and 
wrong acts, just as in doing good. […] So creativity cannot be a disposition to produce 
objects that have objective value. (Bird and Hills 2018: 8) 
Despite our revulsion to Carrier’s method of execution, we would usually acknowledge 
that he was creative at devising and performing his crimes. Since deplorable actions like this 
have an openly negative value, to include a (positive) value requirement in the definition of 
creativity –so the argument goes– has to be mistaken. However, I believe that it is possible 
to address the challenge of dark creativity also appealing to the idea of “valuable-in-a-way” 
introduced above.  
It would be helpful to start by comparing the term ‘creative’ with others such as 
‘intelligent’, ‘precise’, ‘rigorous’, ‘thoughtful’, and ‘elegant’. We typically employ these terms 
as epistemic or aesthetic values, and sometimes as intellectual virtues too. In philosophy of 
science for instance, ‘precision’, ‘elegance’ and ‘rigour’ are discussed as important epistemic 
values for theory choice or model construction (Kuhn 1977; Anderson 2004; Douglas 2013). 
In aesthetics and art criticism, an artwork that is thought-provoking would be judged 
‘intelligent’ or ‘thoughtful’, and artists are praised for their ‘elegance’ or ‘precision’ (see also 
Turner [2019] and Breitenbach [2020] on the inclusion of aesthetic judgments in scientific 
practice). Yet, all these terms can have a dark side as well. It is possible to say that “a criminal 
has been ‘rigorous’ and ‘thoughtful’ in the way he executed his crimes”, that “the murdering 
was ‘precise’ and ‘intelligent’”, and that a “certain method of execution was ‘elegant’”. The 
 
7 Here I am implicitly endorsing the view, defended among others by Elgin (2017) and Potochnik (2015, 2017), 
that the production of true beliefs is not the most important epistemological endeavour in the domain of science, 
but, instead, it is the advancement of (non-factive) understanding. Defending this particular view is beyond the 
scope of this article. At any rate, my aim here is defending a flexible characterization of the value of creativity, 
for which we do not necessarily need to endorse this particular view, but only recognize that in common 
epistemic practices –such as those discussed in section 3– competent epistemic agents commonly admit the 
worth of creative products in terms that are not reducible to (or exclusively identifiable) with truth. 
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question is whether situations of dark creativity (as well as ‘dark elegance’, ‘dark 
thoughtfulness’, ‘dark rigour’, etc.) are significant enough to convince us to stop identifying 
these concepts with values and virtues, and, instead, treat them as valueless or evaluatively 
neutral concepts to which we might exceptionally attach a positive or a negative valence. I 
believe that it would be unfortunate, at least from the perspective of a philosophical analysis 
that is well-grounded in epistemic practices, to do so and take these concepts out of our 
common stock of values and virtues, given how useful they are in such practices to evaluate 
the adequacy of certain objects, ideas, or processes. So, even if we admit that cases of dark 
creativity are a challenge for the standard view on creativity, we might lose more explanatory 
power redefining creativity as a valueless concept –as the key to understanding its typical 
role is its functioning as a positive value or a virtue– than we would gain from accounting for 
these exceptional dark cases. 
In any case, I do not believe that cases of dark creativity are really a challenge for the 
standard view on creativity. When we admit that a despicable crime was creative, we are, very 
much to our regret, noting that the crime was novel, and that such novelty has a merit at 
least in the sense that it allows us to see more clearly a tradition of a certain type of crime, 
understand patterns in it, and possibly also suggest new effective ways of achieving 
(despicable) goals. This does not mean that we have to approve the consequences of the 
criminal acts, nor need we to feel moral esteem for the criminals. But we are conceding some 
kind of credit to the ability of certain individuals to come up with novel ways of effectively 
carrying out planned actions in comparison to how they were carried out in the past. In fact, 
it is difficult to imagine that we would judge crimes that we know were totally ineffective or 
didn’t trigger any consideration to how previous crimes were committed as cases of dark 
creativity.8 Evidence that we are expressing an element of worth when we assign an immoral 
act the adjective ‘creative’ is that doing so provokes us discomfort, uneasiness, and that we 
would say that we have to “admit” or “concede” that it was creative. If creativity was a value-
free or evaluatively neutral concept, the uneasiness would be unjustified.  
At any rate, Bird and Hills (2018: 8) could reply that if the previous argument was right, 
then calling evil acts creative would “mitigate the harm produced so we can say that the 
torture was horrific, but at least it was produced creatively”. Contrary to this, “if anything, 
that very fact makes things worse” (Ibid.). I agree with Bird and Hills that this might be 
frequently the case. The reason, though, is not that the concept of creativity is value-free and 
that it indistinctly carries a negative or a positive valence. Calling evil acts creative might 
make them worse because it outrages us that people’s disposition for creativity, their efforts, 
abilities, and motivations, are put to the service of morally contemptible goals. But this fact 
is independent from recognizing that judging some evil acts creative is attributing them a 
value-in-a-way, that is, a merit which involves a type of novelty that typically affords 
understanding of similar preceding and future acts. Ultimately, there is a plurality of values, 
 
8 Following a suggestion of a reviewer, one might wonder about the existence of creative crimes that we don’t 
hear or know about that could have been ineffective. This paper is interested in how epistemic agents actually 
attribute the concept ‘creative’ to certain objects, ideas, and people in their practices. The aim is not to establish 
an objective measure of creativity that allows us to say whether something that we don’t know about is creative 
or not, including cases of dark creativity. So unknown and unheard cases of crimes (or anything else we don’t 
have access to) are not relevant for the discussion here. 
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epistemic and non-epistemic, usually in trade-off with one another. And creativity is only one 
among them, as I discuss in more detail in section 3. So even if we attribute a (very specific, 
restricted) epistemic value to evil acts when we admit that they are creative, we can be 
attributing them at the same time multiple and stronger negative values of an epistemic, 
moral, and social kind.   
Note that my response to argument 3) is different from other recent ways of 
addressing the challenge of dark creativity. Novitz (2003: 78) for instance tries to respond to 
the challenge arguing that cases of dark creativity are not genuine cases of creativity, but 
cases of “ingenious destruction”. Cropley (2011: 353) argues that cases of dark creativity such 
as the 9/11 attacks are valuable only in the sense that for a small group of people (i.e. the 
hijackers) they were noble, useful, and morally commendable acts. And Gaut (2018: 129) 
argues that creative products are only valuable of their kind, and that some kinds may be bad 
ones (e.g. terrorist acts, torture devices). Although these arguments help elucidate different 
aspects of the problem of dark creativity, I believe that they fail to fully capture our intuitions 
about cases of dark creativity such as the attacks of 9/11. Many of us have the feeling that 
the attacks of 9/11 were indeed creative, not just “ingeniously destructive”, as Novitz (2003) 
argues, while we feel uneasy recognizing it, that is, while not sharing the views of the 
perpetrators, which is the explanation that Cropley (2011) offers. Moreover, this uneasiness 
becomes stronger when we realize that by recognizing the creativity of the 9/11 attacks we 
are ascribing them a merit that might go beyond the very specific kind ‘terrorist acts’ to which 
they belong, as Gaut (2018) argues. That is, our attribution of creativity (and therefore of 
value-in-a-way) to these acts can involve a broader acknowledgement of merit that also 
reaches kinds such as those concerning the use of tactical skills, organizational abilities, or 
strategies (even if they would not reach kinds directly involving moral goods or fairness).9 
My response to argument 3) can do a better job at capturing these various intuitions, by 
basically not denying that there is a limited ascription of value when we call certain instances 
creative, including cases of dark creativity.  
 
I contended that arguments 1), 2), and 3) are not persuasive enough to convince us to 
discard the standard view on creativity and endorse a value-free definition thereof. Yet, it is 
important to acknowledge that Bird and Hills (2018) have contributed to the recent debate 
about the value of creativity in several ways. First, they have brought to the fore the fact that 
many valuable things in science and art are not the product of creativity, and that more 
creativity is not necessarily better (Ibid: 17-18). An account of creativity should certainly 
accommodate this fact, and highlight, as I try to do in section 3 for the case of scientific 
practices, that things can be epistemically valuable for many different reasons, being their 
creativity just one among them. Second, Bird and Hills have rightly criticized the vagueness 
or ambiguity with which the value requirement is often formulated in definitions of creativity. 
They note that “defenders of the standard view are not always completely clear about the 
kind of value they have in mind when they say that creativity is a disposition to produce value” 
 
9 In any case, disagreeing with Gaut (2018) for locating objects in too narrow kinds in order to respond to the 
challenge of dark creativity is compatible with endorsing his general claim that the value of creativity ought to 
be understood always in relation to certain contexts, domains, and historical circumstances, as I further defend 
in sections 2 and 3. 
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(Ibid: 8). Indeed, this unhelpful lack of clarity has given rise to the misattribution of 
unwarranted merits to creative ideas and people, and, I believe, also motivated philosophers 
like Bird and Hills themselves to reject the standard view as it stands. My suggestion, as it 
will become clearer in the next sections, is that we should, instead of rejecting the standard 
view, address this lack of clarity by further advancing a range of characterizations of the value 
of creativity for different epistemic situations. Third, Bird and Hills have offered a rich 
reconceptualization of creativity as largely a matter of the imagination, which I believe can 
significantly contribute to our explanations of the phenomenon of creativity when understood 
as a disposition of individuals (perhaps not so directly to explain creativity as a quality of 
object or ideas) (Ibid.: 2, 18).10 Thus, I suggest that, in future work, Bird and Hills’ proposal 
is read not necessarily in opposition to the standard view but in complementarity to it, in a 
way that studying the role of the imagination informs the understanding of the distinctive 
type of value involved in subjects’ creativity attributions (see also Gaut 2003). 
For now, in section 2, I offer more specific reasons for why it is important to keep the 
value condition in the definition of creativity, drawing on the idea that creativity is a thick 
epistemic concept. 
 
 
2. Thick epistemic concepts and creativity 
  
A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also 
substantially descriptive (Kyle 2013, 2016). Bernard Williams (1985) first introduced the idea 
of ‘thick concept’ in metaethics with his book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. In his own 
words, a thick concept is both “world-guided” (as it picks out particular properties of the 
world) and “action-guiding” (as it offers reasons for action or attaches an evaluative flag to 
the concept) (Williams 1985: 140-1). Paradigmatic examples of thick concepts are ‘courage’, 
and ‘cruel’, while typical thin or purely evaluative concepts are ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘wrong’, and 
‘right’. In recent epistemology, there is an increasing interest in discussing whether there are 
thick epistemic concepts as well, mirroring the debate in metaethics.11 I believe that looking 
precisely at these debates on thick concepts in epistemology can inform ongoing discussions 
in the philosophy of creativity, especially regarding the value of creativity.  
 
2.1. Thick concepts in epistemology 
 
10 Bird and Hills (2018: 3) define the imagination as the “ability to produce a particular type of mental 
representation”, and attribute it two specific uses in creativity: one, to help “find ways of simultaneously meeting 
a number of constraints”, such as when a poet tries to find the right poetic form at, at the same time, the right 
words to express an emotion; and two, to “bring together ideas perhaps from what were, until now, different 
[…] traditions” (Ibid. 17). 
11 A point of controversy here is whether the epistemic is sufficiently like the ethical to conclude that the same 
distinction between thin and thick holds for the epistemic domain. Roberts (2018) presents strong arguments 
to defend that they are, and I am assuming the same here.  
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‘Creative’ and ‘creativity’ are not purely descriptive concepts in the way ‘blue’ or ‘water’ 
are. They are not purely evaluative concepts either. Observing common uses of these concepts 
in everyday talk and, more crucially, in specialized epistemic contexts such as scientific 
practices, should make us recognise them as thick epistemic concepts.12 Traditionally in 
epistemology the concepts that have occupied central stage are thin concepts, that is, those 
that function in a fundamentally evaluative or normative way, such as ‘justification’, ‘warrant’, 
and ‘knowledge’. However, a growing group of epistemologists contend that thick epistemic 
concepts might actually be more prevalent than thin concepts in practice. Thus, paying more 
attention to them would help revivify current philosophical analysis (Kotzee and Wanderer 
2008: 342; see also Putnam 2002; Axtell and Carter 2008; Roberts 2018). Paradigmatic 
examples of thick epistemic concepts include ‘curious’, ‘intellectual humility’, ‘open-
mindedness’, and ‘dogmatic’. And other recent attempts to identify thick epistemic concepts 
can be found in Elgin (2008), who discusses ‘trustworthiness’; Siegel (2008), who discusses 
‘education’; Poznic (2018), who discusses ‘scientific representation’; and Alexandrova (2017), 
who discusses ‘well-being’.13  
Let us take ‘dogmatic’ as an illustrative example of a term that expresses a thick concept. 
When we say that “Maria is dogmatic” we are doing two things: describing her as holding 
strong beliefs, and evaluating her negatively for doing so (Kyle 2016). We could indeed think 
of situations where holding strong beliefs is not seen in a negative way, for instance when 
someone has willingness to discuss her beliefs rationally. But this would not be a reason to 
deny that ‘dogmatic’ is a thick term that entails a negative evaluative stance. In those 
situations, we just wouldn’t use the term dogmatic. Instead, we would say that Maria is 
assertive or faithful to her beliefs. Similarly, if we thought that da Vinci’s sketches were 
completely worthless, we simply wouldn’t call them creative, in the same way we don’t call 
my doodling in the margin of the page creative. When epistemic agents decide to attribute da 
Vinci’s drawings the adjective ‘creative’, they are expressing an evaluation in the form of a 
(limited) attribution of merit, even if this merit does not translate into value in general, value 
tout court, or truth. 
Also, one could conceive of situations where the use of the term ‘dogmatic’ could change. 
For instance, in a historical context where the instability of beliefs in a community is 
pervasive, the term dogmatic might start to be adopted to praise individuals who are able to 
commit to their beliefs. Perhaps these conceivable situations are a challenge for someone who 
wants to establish an undisputable, fixed definition of the term ‘dogmatic’. Whether it is 
possible to achieve that or not is a semantic point that I will not address here. But what seems 
certain is that, if the goal is to advance an informative explanation of the phenomenon of 
dogmatism as we experience it, it is not a good strategy to treat the term ‘dogmatic’ as if it 
 
12 I also believe that creativity is a thick aesthetic concept, and many of the things I argue in what follows help 
support this idea too. Other examples of thick aesthetic concepts are ‘gracefulness’, ‘dumpiness’ or ‘elegance’, 
(see Williams, 1985: 140–145; Kirchin 2013; Zangwill 2001; Bronzon 2009; Kyle 2016). However, I will only 
discuss thick epistemic concepts in this paper, since the debate on thick aesthetic concepts deals with peculiar 
difficulties that require separate analysis. I also avoid the problem of how the realms of the aesthetic, the 
epistemic, and the ethical overlap to an important extent. 
13 More precisely, Alexandrova (2017: 83-4) discusses ‘well-being’ not as an example of “thick concept” but of 
“mixed claim”. She proposes the expression “mixed claims” in part to avoid the foundational controversies 
attached to the debate on thick concepts, although acknowledging the closeness between these terminologies. 
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did not function as a thick concept that typically encompasses a negative evaluation on how 
certain beliefs are held. In other words, it is doubtful that a value-free definition of 
‘dogmatism’ would help us understand our actual experiences with dogmatic ideas and 
dogmatic people. In a similar vein, if we propose a value-free definition of creativity, we would 
be overlooking the evaluative content that is most characteristic of our ascriptions of the term 
to certain people and objects, thus hindering our grasp of the phenomenon it conceptualizes. 
A clarification is required here. The discussion about thick concepts might seem so far 
to be a problem of conceptual analysis, that is, a problem of how to analyse the words ‘creative’ 
and ‘creativity’ and not about what creativity is. This is not exactly so. Following Elgin (2008: 
372), a terminological discussion might be helpful to begin with, but the goal of discussing 
the particularities of thick terms is not to produce a dictionary with exact definitions, but to 
elucidate “the constitution of the epistemic realm”, which elements comprise it and how they 
relate to each other. Traditionally, there were two different things we could do with language: 
evaluate and describe (Roberts 2018: 162). If thick concepts can do the two things at the same 
time, and we conclude that concepts like ‘curiosity’, ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘creativity’ are thick 
and play important roles in our epistemic practices, we would have to reassess how our 
epistemic realm is constituted according to this.  
 
2.2. Entanglement 
A fundamental feature of thick concepts (both ethical and epistemic) is the tied 
connection between their descriptive and evaluative components (Roberts 2013; Kotzee and 
Wanderer 2008). The disentangling argument was formulated by McDowell (1998) precisely 
to expose the difficulties of separating these components, or the irreducible thickness of thick 
concepts. In other words, we should not be thinking of thick concepts as having an original 
descriptive content, to which an evaluative stance (such as those expressed by thin concepts) 
is just added to it (Poznic 2018: 3435).14 The implication this has for the debate of creativity 
is that the evaluative component of the concept of creativity (that is, what I identified so far 
the “value requirement” in the definition of creativity) cannot be understood as detached or 
disconnected from its descriptive component (identifiable with the “novelty requirement”). 
Recognizing the creativity of Herschel’s ideas about Uranus or about the surface of the Moon 
is assigning them a value attached to the novelty that such ideas exhibited. The value is not 
an extra aspect added to it, but is built into the meaning of the term ‘creative’ when attributed 
to Herschel’s ideas. 
To see the difference between a definition of creativity that takes it as an (irreducibly) 
thick concept and one that allows a factor analysis of its components, it is helpful to consider 
Elgin’s (2008: 372) newly coined predicate ‘gred’. ‘Gred’ applies to all and only things that 
are good and red, so it is both a descriptive and an evaluative concept. A gred mitten, for 
 
14 There are actually different views on this point in the debate about thick concepts. For some philosophers it 
is possible to grasp what thick concepts mean even if we analytically separate their descriptive and evaluative 
components, because these components are connected only in a pragmatic way (Väyrynen 2013). Meanwhile, 
for other philosophers, especially non-reductivists, thick concepts conceptually entail evaluative content, so it is 
not possible to grasp their meaning separating the evaluative and descriptive components (Williams 1985; 
Dancy 1995; Roberts 2018; see Roberts 2013: 677-8). My proposal is closer to the latter group but any of these 
positions can help sustain the arguments on the thickness of creativity presented here. 
[Preprint]    Sánchez-Dorado (2020) 
 14 
instance, satisfies the descriptive requirement (by being red) and the evaluative requirement 
(by being good at warming my hand). However, “a gred item’s being red has no bearing on 
its being good; nor has its being good any bearing on its being red. It is simply a contraction” 
(Ibid.). Thick epistemic concepts are not mere contractions, because without them we 
wouldn’t be able to partition the world as we do now, marking out extensions –such as the 
extension of creative objects– that the mere sum of thin concepts (like good) and purely 
descriptive ones (like red) wouldn’t be able to mark out (Ibid.: 375). We could say that thick 
concepts express a sui generis evaluation, that is, an evaluation that picks out particular 
features of the world, and is not replaceable by the sum of a thin concept and a description 
(Kyle 2016; Williams 1985). Advocates of thicker forms of epistemology contend that the sui 
generis evaluation expressed by concepts like ‘trustworthy’ and –I argue– ‘creative’ might be 
prior and more fundamental than the evaluation expressed by thin concepts like ‘knowledge’, 
in the sense that the former are necessary to grasp “what makes knowledge worth having” in 
the first place (Elgin 2008: 387; see also Kotzee and Wanderer 2008: 342; Roberts 2018: 164; 
Fricker 2007).   
There is an additional reason to support the idea that the evaluative and descriptive 
components of creativity are entangled. Namely, attempts to explain the supposedly mere 
descriptive part of creativity (i.e. its aspect of novelty15) cannot help but introduce positive 
value judgments. For instance, Kronfeldner (2014) argues that she “shall concentrate on 
novelty” in her analysis of creativity, without dealing with the issue of value (2014: 578). But 
then, in order to clarify in what sense something must be novel in order to be creative, 
Kronfeldner refers to ‘originality’ and ‘spontaneity’, understood as adequate degrees of 
independence from a tradition and previous learning (Ibid.: 584). This characterization 
suggests a positive stance on the kind of ‘newness’ that creativity is about. Actually, the more 
evaluatively neutral term to be used here would have been ‘newness’, but it is rarely employed 
to define creativity, probably given its evaluative unspecificity. When we describe something 
new as ‘novel’ and ‘original’, we already attribute some type of worth to it. We are saying that 
such newness is neither a conventional one –like a product that is new but predictable or 
repetitive– nor a negative one –like a product that is new but unorthodox in an undesirable 
or irrelevant way. In fact, ‘novelty’ and ‘originality’ could be considered thick concepts as 
well, with a positive evaluative flag attached to them.16  
Another example of the filtration of positive value judgments in the characterization of 
the descriptive content of creativity can be found in Kieran (2014). Kieran discusses 
motivation,17  one of the requirements for creativity in his view, which is in principle separate 
 
15 Also its aspects of imagination and motivation would be part of this descriptive content of creativity as well, 
in case we develop an expanded version of the standard view focused on creativity as a disposition of individuals 
(see Bird and Hills [2018], Kieran [2014], and Gaut [2012]). 
16 For the case of ‘spontaneity’, which Kronfeldner (2014: 588-9) also introduces to describe the kind of newness 
that creativity is about, I concede that this might not be a thick concept but a descriptive one. Still, philosophers 
like Gaut (2018) take spontaneity as encompassing an element of positive value too: “Since we value spontaneity, 
and creativity involves an element of spontaneity, part of the explanation for the final value of creativity lies in 
its dimension of spontaneity” (Ibid.: 140-1). 
17 More specifically, Kieran (2014) discusses “internal or intrinsic motivation”. He also considers “external 
motivations”, such as commercial gain or celebrity status, but attributes only to internal motivations the role of 
making creativity a virtue of character. 
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from the value requirement. But then, he defines motivation as an “acting out of a desire to 
realize what makes something valuable […], expressive, imaginative, or beautiful” (Ibid.: 
129), and considers the motivation of a creative person “itself a praiseworthy achievement of 
character” (Ibid.: 132). So in Kieran’s (2014) account, creative agents direct their motivation 
into the production of epistemically or aesthetically commendable objects. Here, the value of 
creativity is not only involved in its corresponding requirement (of value), but is strongly 
present in the characterization of the descriptive content of creativity, namely, it is ingrained 
in the motivation requirement.  
In accordance with the arguments above, I suggest that philosophers should openly 
recognize the irreducible thickness of the concept of creativity, and advance thick accounts, 
instead of thin accounts, thereof.18 A thick account of creativity is one that builds on the same 
intuitions which underlie the standard view, as it recognizes at its basis both an element of 
novelty and an element of value. But it goes beyond the standard view because it stresses the 
entanglement between these two elements, and tries to spell out, by narrowing down as much 
as possible, what such entanglement comprises for specific epistemic contexts. Meanwhile, a 
thin account of creativity would be one that only acknowledges the descriptive content of the 
concept (i.e. Bird and Hills 2018), or acknowledges both but examines them separately 
(Kronfeldner 2014, Kieran 2014). I believe that this latter group of thin accounts would have 
benefited from taking a thick turn and acknowledging the entanglement between the two 
contents of creativity instead of factorizing them. For instance, Kronfeldner (2014) could have 
advanced further insight on why originality and spontaneity are the adequate kinds of novelty 
that creativity requires, by referring to the ascribed value that we, as competent epistemic 
agents, concede to certain forms of newness (namely, those that expand our tradition and 
permit progress) and not to others. And Kieran (2014) could have further vindicated the 
importance of subjects’ internal motivations by bringing in the role played by evaluative 
attitudes and shared value judgments in directing subjects’ creative work. 
Developing a thick account of creativity requires to adopt both a flexible and a domain-
specific conception of epistemic value. A flexible characterization of epistemic value is one 
that may recognize the importance of generating new justifications or true beliefs, but also 
contemplates a plurality of other ways in which things can be epistemically worthy without 
being substantially true, or in addition to being true (Elgin 2017; Potochnik 2017). This idea 
is in line with numerous accounts in recent philosophy of science that highlight the existence 
of a plurality of values in trade-off with one another in practice, as I spell out in section 3 
(Kuhn 1977; Anderson 2004; Parker 2010; Douglas 2013). Apart from flexible, the 
characterization of the epistemic value of creativity should be domain-specific and narrowed-
down to particular situations. This is because a “mere value condition” in the definition of 
creativity is just uninformative (Stokes and Paul: 2016: 3n), and a thick account should aim 
to bring clarity to how creative instances are “valuable-in-a-way” in different contexts. In the 
 
18 The idea of a thick account of creativity builds on Poznic (2018), who distinguishes between thick and thin 
accounts of ‘scientific representation’; Currie (2018), who argues that we need thick descriptions of epistemic 
situations, precisely in the context of discussing the role of creativity in science; and Alexandrova (2017), who 
highlights the importance of “mixed claims” in scientific practice, that is, claims that incorporate both an 
empirical hypothesis and a value judgment.   
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next section, I take the first step towards the advancement of a –hopefully in the future more 
comprehensive– thick account of creativity, focusing on scientific practices as a case in point. 
 
 
3. Creativity and the plurality of values in science 
 
I have thus far argued that creativity, as a thick epistemic concept, includes value in its 
content. But how should we capture this value, entangled with an element of novelty, in actual 
epistemic contexts? The aim of this section is to characterize, by narrowing down, such 
entanglement in a paradigmatic epistemic domain, namely scientific practices.19  
 
3.1. Worth of creativity in science  
Without aiming to exhaust the task of spelling out the epistemic value of creativity 
for any possible situation in scientific practices, I offer a flexible characterization consisting 
in three typical ways in which creative models and methods are epistemically worthy (qua 
creative). Namely, I identify the value of creative instances in science with their ability to 
clarify a tradition, with fruitfulness, and with the fulfilment of exploratory aims.  
Drawing on Carroll (2010), one could claim that there is a minimal sense in which 
creative instances are valuable, and then stronger ways in which they might be so as well. 
The minimal sense concerns the capacity of such instances to clarify the tradition in which 
they are embedded (Ibid.: 70-71). Although Carroll (2010) was mainly trying to characterize 
the value of creativity in the arts, I take this to be also a minimal, common denominator of 
epistemic value shared by creative instances in science. In this minimal sense, a creative 
scientific model, theory, or method would be epistemically worthy insofar as it shows us “the 
tradition and its possibilities more clearly, expansively, and perspicuously than earlier works” 
(Ibid.). This is because creative objects “recombined elements and concerns of the tradition in 
an especially deft, original, or insightful way”, making our previous commitments manifest in 
a way that was not so patent before (Ibid.). It might be the case that some creative models 
and methods end up being impractical or inadequate for the scientific community that 
produced them, and eventually abandoned. Still, qua creative, they were epistemically 
valuable at least in the sense that their novelty brought some commitments of the tradition 
to the fore, allowing qualified epistemic agents to better discuss, understand, revise, and 
challenge such tradition. And this, in turn, frequently increases the possibilities of an inquiry 
to correct itself and move forward. 
A good example of a creative scientific model whose epistemic value (entangled with 
novelty) can be spelt out in terms of the clarification of a tradition is the MONIAC or Phillip’s 
 
19 In this section I frequently refer to the “value of creativity” or “creativity as an epistemic value” plainly, 
without explicitly reiterating each time that such value is a value-in-a-way attached to an element of novelty. 
After the disentangling arguments presented earlier, it should be clear at this point that referring to the value 
of creativity is equivalent to referring to the “novel worth”, “worthy novelty”, “value-in-a-way”, “thickness”, or 
“sui generis evaluation” of creativity.  
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hydraulic machine from 1949 (Vines 2000; Morgan 2012; Frigg and Nguyen 2017). Phillip’s 
machine is a model formed by a system of tanks, valves and pipes through which water flows, 
and that aimed at representing the dynamics of market demands in an economy. In a stagnant 
moment of inquiry, in which resources to reason about policy intervention on an economy 
seemed insufficient to make the field move forward, producing a creative model like this was 
particularly desirable (Vines 2000). The MONIAC exposed important commitments and 
resources used to represent economic systems in the past, making them now “immensely 
visible” (Ibid.: 58). It allowed scientists to reason about money transactions “vividly” for the 
first time, while looking at water tanks rise, and to ask questions about policy in a very 
material manner, while operating valves and pumps manually (Ibid.: 46-49). A creative model 
like Phillip’s machine was epistemically worthy (qua creative) to the extent that its novelty 
helped to expose traditional assumptions in economics, and stimulated questions about how 
to better exploit representational resources in future practices.  
Indeed, the epistemic worth of Phillips’ machine qua creative did not entail that the 
model was prolific or successful in a stronger sense. The MONIAC did not for instance 
impose a new form of modelling the dynamics of market demands in the field, as hydraulic 
models (or physical analogical models more broadly) would continue to be very scarce in 
economic research afterwards. In some cases though, allowing to clarify a tradition of past 
theories, methods, and representational resources through creative models proves to be 
highly fruitful, the key to make a whole field emerge or evolve. Fruitfulness is therefore a way 
of spelling out the value of creativity in scientific contexts that sometimes complements the 
minimal sense (see Kuhn 1977; McMullin 1976, 1979; Nolan 1999; and Ivani 2019, for 
discussions on the value of fruitfulness in science; and Šešelja and Straßer 2013, and Nyrup 
2018, on related issues on pursuitworthiness). If we look at other cases, such as R. A. Fisher’s 
work in population genetics in the 1930s, we would say that his ideas were creative both in 
the sense that their novelty allowed to clarify a tradition, and that such clarification was 
highly fruitful (see Fisher 1930). Fisher’s work made manifest the latent explanatory 
possibilities of the –previously proposed– Darwinian theory of natural selection and 
Mendelian inheritance principles, which he combined using novel mathematical models. This 
allowed to eventually open a whole new field of investigation that would be key in 20th 
century biology, namely modern synthesis. Here the revision of the tradition not only offered 
a better understanding of it, but was “bountiful— its consequences have been both copious 
and beneficial for the practice to which it belongs” (Carroll 2010: 70).  
Of course being bountiful or fruitful can only be calculated retrospectively, after 
having observed the branching lines of development that a certain work motivated (Carroll 
2010: 70; see also Schaffer 1994). But, before we can observe that, creativity can function as  
an important epistemic value that helps regulate ongoing scientific practices, together with 
other values (epistemic and non-epistemic) that it might be in combination or trade-off with 
(see). When scientists judge that in their current work a certain model is creative, they are 
recognizing that the model brings to the fore some assumptions of the tradition, allowing to 
see patterns in it, and perhaps also that the model is appropriate for carrying out certain 
epistemic tasks. Exploration, I argue, is the most obvious of these tasks. Exploratory 
modelling and exploratory experimentation are important part of the scientific enterprise. 
They aim at getting a grasp of natural phenomena in the absence of a well-established theory, 
and in occasions in the absence of even a well-delineated target system (Gelfert 2018: 222-
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224; see also Steinle [1997], Burian [1997], Elliott [2007], and McLeod and Nersessian 
[2013] on exploratory experimentation; and Boden 2004 on “exploratory creativity”). 
Philosophers of science have generally paid more attention to scientific models that have 
explanatory or predictive potential, and only occasionally analysed the particularities of 
exploratory models (Gelfert 2018: 230). This has stressed the importance of epistemic values 
such as observational accuracy, precision, and external consistency in their analyses. 
Meanwhile, in exploratory research, creativity becomes a particularly appreciated epistemic 
value. 
A recent example of exploratory astronomical science illustrates this. In April 2019 
the first image of a supermassive black hole situated at the centre of the M87 galaxy was 
publicly released.20 The achievement resulted from the work of the Event Horizon Telescope 
(EHT), an international team that developed a creative methodology consisting in the 
synchronization of large amounts of data collected at eight ground-based telescopes located 
at different points of the Earth. Allegedly, when all those data were synchronized, with the 
help of atomic clocks, complex imaging algorithms, and after filling in numerous gaps of 
information, a planet-sized telescope, able to produce an image of a black hole, was virtually 
created. This method, which involves the coordinated use of different telescopes, can be 
considered highly creative –and as such epistemically valuable– because it is bringing clarity 
to our tradition of observational and imaging methods in astronomy, by allowing to see 
previously unseen possibilities in the study of distant astronomical objects with telescopes 
that have a limited resolution capacity. Moreover, the EHT, in virtue of its creative character, 
is especially suitable to carry out exploratory tasks: it is proving helpful to delineate more 
sharply targets that are still largely unknown such as black holes, and suggest new ways of 
testing Einstein’s theoretical claims about black holes. We are yet unable to say whether this 
method will be prolific in the coming years. But we can certainly agree that it is a creative 
methodology that issues a promissory note about its potential fruitfulness (Carroll 2010: 71). 
 
3.2. Plurality of epistemic values in science 
In an attempt to offer a narrowed-down and flexible characterization of the epistemic 
value of creativity in scientific practice, I associated such value with its potential to clarify a 
tradition, frequently suggesting fruitful ways of improving it, and sometimes also helping 
fulfil exploratory aims. However, there is a plurality of epistemic values at play in scientific 
practices (Brown 2012; Douglas 2013; Potochnik 2015; Parker 2020). So it might be the case 
that a creative model is not the most desirable type of model in certain epistemic 
circumstances, and that a creative methodology is not the most appropriate methodology 
with regards to certain goals. Instead, we might want to prioritize values like precision, 
external consistency, observational accuracy, scope, simplicity, or a combined balance of some 
of these when the circumstances demand so. On this point, I certainly agree with Bird and 
Hills (2018: 14) that “if creativity is in part responsible for the success of modern science, that 
 
20 Press Release Event Horizon Telescope (April 10, 2019): Astronomers Capture First Image of a Black Hole. 
https://eventhorizontelescope.org/press-release-april-10-2019-astronomers-capture-first-image-black-hole. 
For full articles with results, telescope methodology, and imaging process see: The Event Horizon Telescope 
Collaboration et al (2019) L1, L2, L3, L4, L5 and L6. 
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is only because it is being used in a particular context”, and not in contexts where it is not 
mostly required. For instance, if the purpose of a certain practice is to produce a copy or 
duplicate of an original (e.g. an experiment), creativity might not be necessary at all, or not 
in a substantial way (Ibid.: 15).  
Recognizing creativity as an epistemic value (with a descriptive content associated to 
novelty) does not mean ascribing creative models or methods a total worth. In fact, scientific 
models are only valuable to very specific respects (epistemically, socially, ethically), and even 
to each of these respects, only in very concrete ways. For this reason, philosophers like Parker 
(2010, 2020) have argued that to talk about the mere adequacy of a scientific model is rather 
ambiguous, insofar as the good performance of the model in the past (or regarding certain 
epistemic aims) does not guarantee its good performance in the future (or regarding other 
epistemic aims). Instead, we should always think in terms of “adequacy-for-purpose” (Parker 
2020: 457; see also Poznic 2018; Potochnik 2015; Douglas 2013). 
Now, in concrete epistemic contexts, what scientists might need the most is to make 
a research program move forward, break with a cognitively stagnant situation, or escape from 
an epistemic inertia that blocks the study of potentially fertile paths of investigation. 
Creativity becomes an important epistemic value precisely in these contexts. Bird and Hills 
(2018: 17-8) would agree with this point too, as they accept the importance of creativity in 
breaking with a tradition that proves to have reached its limits. However, while they think 
that these situations are very unusual and that creativity is not relevant in the majority of 
cases, I believe that situations where a tradition has reached its limit might actually require 
exceptional creativity, yet (more moderate) forms of creativity are a desirable value in 
numerous other scientific situations, such as those described above. Science needs to be “well-
adapted”, that is, different epistemic situations require different research strategies, and 
creative models and methods are particularly desirable when exploration and hot-searches 
are needed (Currie 2018). The case of the EHT method in astronomical research showed this. 
A less creative method in this case would have been one that for instance tries to improve 
individual telescopes, augmenting the angular resolution or sensitivity of each of them. This 
would have perhaps allowed to make slightly more rigorous observations of black holes, 
without the important gaps of information that the EHT method entails. However, this less 
creative method would have not been suitable to carry out the bolder exploratory searches 
that constructing an overall image of black holes demands.  
Recognizing the plurality of epistemic (and non-epistemic) values and aims, and the 
possible trade-offs between them, is fundamental to understanding the specific sense in which 
creative products are valuable. I largely agree with Bird and Hills (2018: 18) in their criticism 
to the “unreflective approval of creativity”. But, differently to them, I have proposed to amend 
such fault with more domain-specific and flexible characterizations of the value of creativity. 
The suggestions in this section, though, are only a partial attempt to spell out the value of 
creativity in scientific modelling practices, and do not aim to be sufficient to advance an 
exhaustive thick account of creativity. In order to build such an account, these suggestions 
would need to be further developed, adjusted, and complemented with other analyses of 
creative instances in different epistemic, as well as aesthetic and everyday contexts. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Explaining creativity in a way that is both informative and compatible with our 
intuitions as speakers embedded in epistemic practices requires to advance thick accounts of 
creativity. A thick account is one that acknowledges that when we employ the concept of 
creativity we are expressing both a description and an evaluation. While the description 
largely involves an element of novelty –and possibly also motivation and imagination when 
we are treating creativity as a disposition of individuals–, the evaluation entails an element of 
epistemic worth or merit.  
Thus stated, it can seem that a thick account of creativity is equivalent to what the 
standard view already said, namely, that being creative has two requirements: being novel and 
being valuable. However, I made an important appreciation. A thick account emphasizes the 
entanglement between the novelty and the value aspects of creativity, while philosophers who 
endorse versions of the standard view frequently examine these aspects as separate 
requirements that are just juxtaposed (Kronfeldner 2014; Kieran 2014). The distinction is 
important because a mere value requirement is uninformative if not attached to the genuine 
type of novelty that creative products exhibit. And vice versa: the genuine novelty of creative 
products is only understandable if linked to its epistemic worth.  
The key to develop a comprehensive thick account of creativity is to spell out as much 
as possible what the “novel worth” or “worthy novelty” of creative instances usually comprises 
in concrete epistemic situations. My final proposal consisted in suggesting three possible 
characterizations of the novel worth of creativity for the case of scientific practices. Namely, 
I identified the value of creative models and methods (qua creative) with their potential to 
clarify a tradition, with fruitfulness, and with the fulfilment of exploratory aims. Moreover, I 
stressed that there is a plurality of epistemic and non-epistemic values in scientific practices, 
usually in trade-off with one another, and that creativity is only one among of them that 
would be prioritized only in specific circumstances. This proposal should be taken as a step 
forward in the project of advancing a richer and more encompassing thick account of creativity 
in the future, which would ideally contribute to elucidate the normative role of creative 
products also in other epistemic and aesthetic situations.  
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